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4.1 Introduction
Little solid evidence exists on the practices of industrialized country
banks operating in emerging markets. Critics of the industrialized coun-
tries’ banks argue that these agents are unstable lenders who undermine lo-
cal ﬁnancial markets. Supporters see the foreign banks as key sources of
otherwise scarce capital, with broader positive spillovers on the stability
and eﬃciency of local ﬁnancial markets. Clearly, there is a need for careful
analysis of the lending practices of industrialized country banks to foreign
clients. Our goal in this paper is to make progress in this direction by exam-
ining the activities of individual U.S. banks with foreign exposures. This
microdata approach facilitates a comparison of the lending behavior of
these banks in the complete set of countries in which the banks have posi-
tions. By working with bank-level data, we can consider which types of U.S.
banks (with size as a deﬁning characteristic) are the more volatile lenders, in
which regions the lending by these banks is most volatile, and whether lend-
ing to certain regions is volatile mainly because of higher volatility of the
economic fundamentals of these regions.
The main data we use are from quarterly foreign exposure data ﬁled by
each U.S. bank (or bank holding company) and collected as a component
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Linda S. Goldbergof the bank supervisory process. The Country Exposure Reports provide a
by-country distribution of the foreign claims held by individual U.S. banks,1
revealing the extent of geographic concentration (and, to a lesser extent, the
maturity and type of concentration) of the bank’s international holdings.
We match these data with bank call report information to achieve corre-
sponding series on the quarterly assets of the same set of banks. Taken to-
gether, these data enable us to discuss the international portfolio allocations
of individual U.S. banks and consider the evolution of U.S. bank claims
abroad.
We pose a number of questions relevant for understanding the scope of
U.S. bank activity in international markets. First, what are the characteris-
tics of those U.S. banks that are international players? We describe the num-
ber of reporting banks, the average size of these banks, the scope of their
international exposures, and the geographical diversification of their
portfolios. Second, what drives changes in U.S. bank claims on particular
countries or regions? We conduct an econometric analysis of the sensitivity
of various international positions to a set of key macroeconomic funda-
mentals. In the same way that Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000) showed that
Japanese banks transmit shocks from Japan to the United States, we con-
sider whether U.S. banks transmit U.S. business cycle ﬂuctuations to their
foreign borrowers. We also posit that U.S. bank international exposures
may be closely tied to the performance of particular countries or regions.
We examine these relationships, considering throughout whether there are
observable diﬀerences in these sensitivities across U.S. banks diﬀerentiated
by their size or across the industrialized or emerging-market partners of the
U.S. banks.
Our main ﬁndings are the following:
•O v er the past two decades, the U.S. banks engaged in international
lending have become more diverse: There are now fewer banks overall,
and these banks are more polarized in terms of their size and portfolio
allocations.
• An increasing portion of reporting U.S. banks, particularly smaller
banks, maintains an exclusive focus on Latin American markets. The
lending by smaller banks, especially with respect to Latin American
and Asian markets, has been more volatile than the lending by larger
banks.
• Compared with smaller U.S. banks, larger banks maintain claims on a
larger number of countries. About 60 percent of large bank exposure is
in industrialized countries, with most of the remaining exposure evenly
split between the emerging markets of Latin America and Asia.
•L o oking across U.S. banks, their foreign claims are highly correlated
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1. The use of the term “U.S. banks” in this paper generally includes U.S.-owned banks and
U.S. subsidiaries of foreign banks.with U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) growth, but not with foreign
demand conditions. The negative correlation between U.S. bank claims
and U.S. GDP growth for industrialized country partners suggests that
net claims on these areas contract when the U.S. economy is expand-
ing. A similar result arises for claims on emerging Asia. By contrast, the
positive correlation observed for claims on Latin American countries
suggests that lending to Latin America expands as the U.S. economy
grows.
•F oreign claims of U.S. banks are correlated with real U.S. interest rates
but generally uncorrelated with foreign real interest rates. Tighter real
lending conditions in the United States are associated with lower real
claims on industrialized countries and higher claims on Latin Ameri-
can countries.
•O verall, U.S. banks have not been volatile lenders internationally. Even
in periods of international ﬁnancial crisis, we do not observe statisti-
cally signiﬁcant or extensive retrenchments of the international claims
of U.S. banks.
These ﬁndings have direct relevance for currency crisis prevention in
emerging markets. First, although U.S. banks are active participants in in-
ternational markets, relatively few of these banks have high shares of their
assets located abroad. A large portion of U.S. international claims remains
within industrialized countries, but certain regions—most particularly
Latin America—are important lending destinations of U.S. banks. In re-
cent years, some small U.S. banks have heavily concentrated claims on
Latin American countries and high ratios of foreign claims to overall bank
assets.
The sensitivity of foreign claims to the U.S. business cycle parallels the
type of observations that have been made by Peek and Rosengren, wherein
Japanese banks were conduits for transmission of Japanese shocks to U.S.
markets. In our sample, these spillovers are statistically signiﬁcant for Latin
America but not consistently so for other emerging market regions.2 The
positive correlation implies that lending to Latin American countries rises
when the United States grows faster, even after controlling for the local
GDP growth. Some of this expansion may be related to trade credit provi-
sion or investments in Latin America’s exporting sectors.
Small countries often express the concern that the international lender—
by conducting lending activities directly through foreign-owned branches
or indirectly through cross-border exposures—will make the emerging-
market economies more sensitive to external ﬂuctuations through the lend-
ing channels. Although we concur that there is evidence of international
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2. In some speciﬁcations there is a signiﬁcantly negative correlation between U.S. GDP
growth and U.S. bank claims on Asian emerging markets. Goldberg and Klein (1998) reached
similar conclusions for foreign direct investment patterns.transmission of cycles, some of this correlation would likely be evident even
in the absence of a U.S. bank presence. More important is the observation
that generally the U.S. lenders are relatively stable providers of credit. Es-
pecially important is the lack of correlation between U.S. bank claims on
emerging markets and the real demand cycles of those markets. These ﬁnd-
ings reinforce the conclusions by Dages, Goldberg, and Kinney (2000) that
foreign banks operating in emerging markets may play an important role
in stabilizing overall lending. Since local banks are highly sensitive to local
conditions, stable credit supplies from external lenders may reduce the lend-
ing and investment instability in emerging-market economies in times of
emerging market ﬁnancial and balance-of-payments crises. As argued by
Palmer (2000), U.S. banks appear to take a long view of their positions in
many industrialized and emerging market regions, and local claims are rel-
atively stable as a result.
The remainder of this paper is divided into three sections. Section 4.2 dis-
cusses the data, the U.S. banks that are lending abroad, and their interna-
tional exposures. Section 4.3 econometrically explores the volatility of the
international claims of the U.S. banks. Section 4.4 provides concluding re-
marks related to currency crisis prevention and presents suggestions for fur-
ther analysis of this rich data source.
4.2 Reporting Banks and Their International Exposures
The main data for our analysis are from Country Exposure Reports ﬁled
quarterly by individual banks. The Federal Financial Institutions Exami-
nations Council (FFIEC) report no. 0093 must be ﬁled by every U.S. char-
tered insured commercial bank in the ﬁfty states of the United States, the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and U.S. territories and possessions,
that meets both of the following criteria:
(1) It has at least one of the following: a branch in a foreign country; a
majority-owned subsidiary in a foreign country; an Edge for Agreement
subsidiary; a branch in Puerto Rico or in any U.S. territory or possession
(except that a bank with its head oﬃce in Puerto Rico or any U.S. territory
or possession need not report if it meets only this criterion); or an Interna-
tional Banking Facility (IBF); and
(2) It has, on a fully consolidated bank basis, total outstanding claims on
residents of foreign countries exceeding $30 million in aggregate.
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3. The FFIEC is an umbrella organization that collects and warehouses data for the Federal
Reserve, Oﬃce of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion. Much of the information collected via the FFIEC 009 is made public, aggregated over all
reporting banks, via the Country Exposure Lending Survey (FFIEC Statistical Release E.16).
Palmer (2000) provides a useful discussion of trends in the aggregated data, with speciﬁc em-
phasis on emerging markets.The reported data provide considerable detail on the U.S. bank claims on
foreign countries, with itemization by individual country. Bank claims are
fairly broadly deﬁned, encompassing credit extended to foreign country
banks, public entities, and other recipients including individuals and busi-
nesses. In addition to direct international ﬂows, bank claims also include
revaluation gains on interest rate, foreign exchange, equity, commodity, and
other oﬀ–balance sheet contracts. The reporting institution is asked to
break down the cross-border claims outstanding by type of borrower
(banks, public sector entities, other) and by time remaining to maturity (one
year and under, one to ﬁve years, and over ﬁve years). In other quarterly re-
ports, banks also provide information on their total assets located both in
the United States and abroad.
There are 200 possible foreign “countries” in which a bank can report an
exposure each quarter. These include industrialized countries; countries
within emerging Europe (encompassing a number of small countries and
countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union); thirty-ﬁve countries
under the heading of Latin America; forty under the heading of Asia/Pa-
ciﬁc and the Middle East; and ﬁfty-four countries within Africa. Each bank
is required to provide detailed information on exposure to a country only
when that exposure exceeds 1 percent of the reporting institution’s total as-
sets or 20 percent of its total capital, whichever is less.
For the time period spanned by our data, 1984 through 2000:Q2, the
number of U.S. reporting banks with foreign exposures changes dramati-
cally (table 4.1). In the second half of the 1980s, an average of 192 banks re-
ported foreign exposures.4Almost all reporting banks maintained positions
in Latin America and in (non-U.S.) industrialized countries. A smaller pro-
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Table 4.1 Average Number of Reporting Banks, Over Time and by Region
1984–89 1990–95 1996–2000
Industrialized countries 182 137 72
Developing Europe 77 37 30
Latin America 183 133 78
Asia 122 85 50
Africa 71 40 27
Middle East 97 78 44
Total reporting banks 192 152 90
4. Our unbalance panel originally began with 317 banks. Thirty-ﬁve banks had only one
year or less of nonzero total exposure data and were deleted from our data set. Those obser-
vations with zero total exposure at any date were deleted from our sample. There were some
foreign banks in our sample whose asset information was not representative of their entire con-
glomerate. Because this created an inconsistency between the scope of exposure information
and the scope of asset information, these banks, classiﬁed as Edge Acts Banks and New York
State Article 12 corporations, and two other banks with unusual situations were eliminated
from the sample.portion of banks is involved in developing Asia, with banks less frequently
involved in Africa and developing Europe.
The average number of reporting banks declined sharply over the course
of the 1990s, down to 152 in the ﬁrst half and to 90 in the latter half of the
1990s. Much of this reduction is associated with the general tendency to-
ward banking sector consolidation in the United States over this period.
Additionally, in the late 1990s some banks opted to report exposures con-
solidated at a bank holding company level, further reducing the number of
distinct reporting institutions.
The data also reveal large changes in the relative popularity of regions
among the reporting banks; over time, a smaller share of reporting banks
was present in each region of the world. For example, whereas 182 banks
had positions in (non-U.S.) industrialized countries in the late 1980s, this
number declined to 72 by the late 1990s.5 The number of U.S. banks active
in Latin America declined to 78.
Alongside the sharp decline in the number of banks over the past two
decades, we observe important changes over time in the size distribution of
the reporting banks (table 4.2). Although the mean and median bank size
basically doubled over the period from 1984 through mid-2000, the actual
change in the size distribution of these banks was much greater. Sorting
banks by quartiles based on their total assets, the average bank in the low-
est quartile became considerably smaller, down from $15 million to $7.5
million in assets. In the next quartile of banks, the average size doubled
since the mid-1980s, with the representative bank growing from $46 million
to $102 million. The size variation within these quartiles of banks also grew
considerably. The banks classiﬁed in the 3rd and especially the 4th quartile
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5. Throughout the paper, when we refer to “industrialized countries” this means industrial-
ized countries other than the United States. The list of countries is provided in table 4A.3.
Table 4.2 Size of Reporting Banks: Total Assets (US$ millions)
1984–89 1990–95 1996–2000
Total reporting banks 178.8 235.1 446.2
(261.1) (309.1) (677.7)
Quartile 1 15.3 12.2 7.5
(9.3) (11.3) (7.3)
Quartile 2 46.5 67.2 101.9
(10.0) (20.1) (48.9)
Quartile 3 112.4 182.0 321.1
(40.5) (49.0) (79.6)
Quartile 4 541.0 680.1 1,353.2
(301.7) (317.9) (823.4)
Note: Means, with standard deviations in parentheses. Banks are sorted into quartiles by as-
set size.more clearly reﬂect the phenomenon of banking sector consolidation. The
average 4th quartile reporting bank tripled in asset size, to more than $1 bil-
lion in assets by the late 1990s, with numerous banks considerably larger.
From both tables 4.1 and 4.2 we conclude that although the number of re-
porting banks has declined, the remaining banks have become considerably
more diverse.
Beyond diﬀerences in size, there are also huge diﬀerences across individ-
ual banks in their foreign exposure, measured as the sum of cross-border
exposure and local country claims, and expressed relative to total bank as-
sets (table 4.3).6 The ﬁrst ﬁve rows of table 4.3 provide the unweighted aver-
ages of foreign exposure shares across all bank observations and within
every period. For all banks taken together (and unweighted by bank size)
there has been a tendency toward increasing shares of foreign exposure in
average U.S. bank portfolios. However, this result is driven by tendencies
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Table 4.3 Foreign Portfolio Shares of Reporting Banks
1984–89 1990–95 1996–2000
Unweighted average across banks 1.6 1.7 1.9
(4.8) (5.8) (6.9)
Quartile 1 2.8 4.1 5.4
(6.8) (9.5) (12.1)
Quartile 2 1.3 0.8 0.7
(3.8) (2.3) (2.3)
Quartile 3 1.0 0.9 0.7
(3.4) (3.5) (2.7)
Quartile 4 1.1 1.1 0.8
(4.4) (4.4) (3.7)
Weighted average across banksa 1.2 1.1 0.8
Reporting Banks with Exposure  1%
Unweighted average across banks 5.7 6.8 8.2
(8.6) (10.6) (13.0)
Quartile 1 7.6 10.3 13.1
(11.5) (14.5) (17.8)
Quartile 2 4.7 6.7 8.7
(6.5) (10.0) (14.0)
Quartile 3 4.7 4.1 5.3
(5.7) (5.5) (7.4)
Quartile 4 5.8 6.1 5.6
(9.1) (9.4) (8.3)
Weighted average across banksa 5.9 6.0 5.7
Note: Means, with standard deviations in parentheses. Foreign exposures as a percent of total
bank assets. Banks are divided into quartiles based on parent assets.
aUsing total asset weights.
6. Observations are included for every period in which a bank reports nonzero foreign ex-
posure.among the smaller banks actively participating in international markets.
These banks have increased their average foreign portfolio share from 2.8 to
5.4 percent of bank assets. By contrast, the larger banks maintain smaller
foreign portfolio shares (at approximately 1 percent of bank assets) with the
overall shares slightly declining over time. Even when portfolio shares of all
banks are weighted by their respective asset positions at each date, the over-
all foreign portfolio share of U.S. banks reporting foreign exposures has de-
clined over time, to under 1 percent of U.S. bank assets.
The low foreign exposure shares in the ﬁrst section of table 4.3 make it
tempting to conclude that international exposures pose very low degrees of
foreign risk to the reporting banks. This conclusion is inappropriate. Risk
analysis is more often conducted in relation to parent bank capital or eq-
uity and is generally not relative to the bank’s overall asset position.7 If a
bank’s capital is 10 percent of assets, a foreign portfolio share of 5 percent
would suggest that the ratio of foreign exposure to capital is 50 percent for
that bank—suggesting that bank equity can be substantially threatened by
adverse external conditions. Additionally, the low numbers of the ﬁrst sec-
tion of table 4.3 are the result of having many banks with low exposures—
at less than 1 percent of assets—reported together with a lesser (but still
substantial) number of banks with much higher foreign exposures.
The second section of table 4.3 provides average exposures for only those
banks that have foreign exposures greater than 1 percent of assets, a re-
striction that reduces our sample to only 15 percent of those observations
reported in the ﬁrst section of the table. Observe that these banks can have
quite large exposures, rising to 8.2 (5.7) as unweighted (weighted) averages
for the late 1990s. The tendency toward increasing exposure over time for
the average bank is especially due to the large increases in foreign exposure
shares by the smaller and medium-sized banks in the sample. This sample
of larger banks has maintained foreign portfolio shares on the order of 5–6
percent of assets for the full period covered by our data.
The form of these exposures has changed over time in terms of regional
concentration and in terms of clientele (e.g., banks, public sector borrow-
ers, or other private borrowers). The diversiﬁcation structure across loca-
tion and clientele is important for ultimately interpreting our analysis of
lending volatility later in the paper. One hypothesis is that when U.S. bank
positions are highly dispersed regionally, their lending may be more insu-
lated from region-speciﬁc disturbances and less volatile, even to regions ex-
periencing shocks.8
Table 4.4 considers the share of all reporting banks, regardless of size,
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7. See Palmer (2000) and Bomﬁm and Nelson (1999) for related discussions of the appro-
priate measurement of risk.
8. Dages, Goldberg, and Kinney (2000) show that within Argentina and Mexico, loans by
domestic privately owned banks are more volatile with respect to local conditions than are
loans by foreign-owned banks.that maintain claims exclusively in one foreign region.9Only 4 percent of all
bank observations correspond to an exclusive position in industrialized
countries. In stark contrast, by the second half of the 1990s more than 12
percent of banks had foreign exposures exclusively concentrated in devel-
oping countries of the Western Hemisphere (e.g., Latin America). These
Latin American markets are the main foreign focus of some small, special-
ized banks operating out of the United States.
Given that a bank maintains an exposure to a particular region, we also
examined the likelihood that the same bank is diversiﬁed to other regions.
Claims on Latin American countries are always likely to be part of a bank’s
portfolio, regardless of other regions in which a bank maintains positions
(see appendix table 4A.1). Moreover, if a bank has a position in Latin
America, with the rise in Latin American specialization we observe a par-
allel decline over time in the likelihood of that bank’s also having positions
in industrialized economies, Asia, and Africa. If any bank has a position in
industrialized countries, there is a greater than 80 percent probability that
the bank will also have positions in Latin America and a 60 percent prob-
ability that it will also have positions in Asia.
The recipients of U.S. banks’ foreign exposure have also evolved over
time and across regions (table 4.5). The last sixteen years are characterized
by a declining (but still substantial) role of bank-to-bank lending, by a gen-
eral decline in lending to public entities, and by the rise in lending to a
broader group of nonbank private clientele.
Distinguishing across regions, we further observe that
• In industrialized countries, the substantial shift away from bank-to-
bank lending matches the rise in nonbank private lending. Public-sec-
tor borrowers have played relatively small roles, hovering at about 10
percent of the U.S. bank claims on these regions.
•T he importance of public-sector borrowers declined substantially as a
fraction of activity in Latin American exposures. The decline was from
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Table 4.4 Percent of All Reporting Banks Maintaining a Position Exclusively in One Region
Exclusive
Position
Exclusive Position in a Single Region
in Any  Industrialized Latin Middle
Region Countries Europe America Asia Africa East
1984–89 9.1 3.0 0.0 5.8 0.1 0.0 0.1
1990–95 13.6 4.9 0.0 6.7 0.8 0.4 0.5
1996–2000 21.5 4.0 0.0 12.7 2.8 0.5 1.7
Note: Last ﬁve columns represent developing country regions.
9. The regions used by the IMF are industrialized countries, developing Europe, developing
Western Hemisphere (mainly Latin America), developing Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.about 40 percent of individual bank claims in the mid- to late 1980s to
just above 10 percent by the late 1990s. In absolute terms, there has
been a huge increase in U.S. bank private lending to Latin American
companies, with a smaller decline in public borrowing.
•F or developing Asia, although the role of public borrowers has de-
creased since the late 1980s, the shift toward direct lending to nonbank
private clients has not been as pronounced as is observed in other re-
gions.
Also of interest is the source of these claims, which may be generated by
cross-border operations or by lending by U.S. branch or subsidiary opera-
tions already located in foreign markets (table 4.6). The ratio of cross-bor-
der claims to total bank claims is near 100 percent for almost all regions and
almost all banks in the lower three quartiles of banks. Local lending activi-
ties are prevalent mainly among the larger banks. Averaging over banks in
the 4th quartile (again, without weighting by bank size), the share of U.S.
bank claims that are generated by local lending is 16 percent for industrial-
ized countries, 24 percent for developing Asia, and 10 percent for Latin
American countries.
As a ﬁnal descriptive exercise before turning to the volatility of claims of
section 4.3, in table 4.7 we show the average importance of particular re-
gions to the foreign exposures of the reporting banks. First, U.S. banks hold
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Table 4.5 Recipient Shares in U.S. Bank Exposure, by Period and Region
Banks Public Other Private
1984–89 47.6 29.1 19.3
Industrialized countries 62.4 12.8 18.7
Developing Europe 36.1 52.1 10.2
Latin America 36.3 40.6 20.8
Asia 47.5 24.4 21.2
Africa 21.2 52.1 23.9
Middle East 45.6 29.3 22.9
1990–95 46.6 21.4 26.6
Industrialized countries 57.9 9.9 24.1
Developing Europe 30.7 41.3 25.9
Latin America 37.5 24.1 35.3
Asia 54.2 11.8 23.3
Africa 22.6 45.3 27.3
Middle East 39.5 40.4 18.1
1996–2000 44.2 15.0 34.7
Industrialized countries 49.0 10.8 32.6
Developing Europe 37.0 28.7 30.6
Latin America 42.4 10.1 43.9
Asia 53.0 4.6 27.7
Africa 29.7 32.0 29.8
Middle East 43.3 35.1 18.9
Note: Percent of total exposure by bank.Table 4.6 The Relative Importance of Cross-Border versus Local Lending, by Region and by
Quartile: % of Cross-Border Exposure
Developing Country Regions
Industrialized Latin Middle
Countries Europe America Asia Africa East
1984–89
All reporting banks 94.1 99.2 98.5 93.5 97.5 98.1
Quartile 1 99.9 99.9 100.0 99.7 100.0 100.0
Quartile 2 99.0 100.0 100.0 99.1 99.9 100.0
Quartile 3 95.9 100.0 99.0 97.5 99.5 100.0
Quartile 4 78.3 98.1 94.1 83.5 95.7 95.5
1990–95
All reporting banks 91.9 98.0 97.0 89.3 95.2 98.0
Quartile 1 99.7 100.0 99.9 99.1 100.0 100.0
Quartile 2 98.1 100.0 99.8 97.8 99.7 100.0
Quartile 3 92.5 99.9 96.4 95.1 100.0 100.0
Quartile 4 74.8 96.3 90.1 74.6 92.2 95.2
1996–2000
All reporting banks 92.2 96.3 96.4 85.3 91.5 97.4
Quartile 1 100.0 100.0 99.8 96.7 100.0 100.0
Quartile 2 96.3 99.9 97.8 89.8 100.0 100.0
Quartile 3 91.6 98.8 96.6 91.5 100.0 100.0
Quartile 4 84.2 96.3 90.5 76.0 92.2 96.0
Table 4.7 Regional Total Exposure Shares, Over Time and by Bank Type
Developing Country Regions
Industrialized Latin Middle
Countries Europe America Asia Africa East
1984–89
All banks 55.5 1.0 26.0 13.3 2.4 1.8
Quartile 1 51.5 0.9 37.5 5.5 1.7 3.1
Quartile 2 52.6 1.2 34.0 10.2 1.1 0.9
Quartile 3 53.5 0.9 29.4 12.7 1.9 1.6
Quartile 4 56.3 1.0 24.2 14.0 2.7 1.9
1990–95
All banks 58.4 0.9 21.7 16.5 1.3 1.3
Quartile 1 57.1 1.1 34.7 3.0 1.8 2.4
Quartile 2 53.5 0.3 29.0 16.0 0.4 0.8
Quartile 3 56.4 0.7 30.1 11.1 0.7 1.0
Quartile 4 59.2 1.0 19.1 18.0 1.4 1.4
1996–2000
All banks 57.5 1.9 22.6 15.6 1.2 1.2
Quartile 1 20.9 1.6 70.9 2.1 1.0 3.6
Quartile 2 48.4 0.3 32.1 17.8 0.4 1.0
Quartile 3 50.1 1.1 33.9 12.7 0.9 1.4
Quartile 4 60.3 2.2 18.7 16.4 1.4 1.0
Note: Unweighted by bank size: share of region in a bank’s total foreign exposure.very small portions of their foreign portfolios in the regions of developing
Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. On average, each of these regions is
on the order of 1–2 percent of the foreign portfolio, regardless of the size of
the banks. Among the largest banks, developing Europe gained popularity
(to 2.2 percent of portfolios) in the second half of the 1990s. Among the
smallest banks, the Middle East is in some cases a higher portion of bank
portfolio (at 3–4 percent).
Reinforcing our earlier observations, table 4.7 shows the importance of
claims on the Latin American countries to the portfolios of both large and
small banks. While small banks have had disproportionately large empha-
sis on Latin American claims (at 37 percent in 1984–89, compared with 24
percent for the banks in the largest quartile), the role of Latin American in-
vestments soared for the smaller banks over the second half of the 1990s.
For 1st quartile banks, Latin American claims reached over 70 percent of
overall foreign exposures by the end of the 1990s. Claims on industrialized
countries have generally been 50–60 percent of the foreign exposures of
U.S. banks and remain at these levels for those banks without a more ex-
clusive Latin American focus.
4.3 The Volatility of International Exposures of U.S. Banks
Although the previous section has demonstrated that signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ences exist across banks and over time in the size and composition of U.S.
bank foreign claims, it did not address the reasons for and timing of changes
in these claims. We now turn to this more dynamic issue, asking whether
ﬂuctuations in claims are econometrically explained by changes in the fun-
damentals of the countries in which these banks have claims and by changes
in the fundamentals of the United States.
To examine the ﬂuctuations of bank claims on speciﬁc groups of coun-
tries, we divide banks by asset size categories and into the three time inter-
vals (1984–89, 1990–95, 1996–2000). We consider three arbitrary size divi-
sions. First, we deﬁne as smaller banks those with less than $50 million in
overall assets (all in real terms). Medium banks have assets of $50 million
to $250 million, and larger banks have assets in excess of $250 million.
Banks are assigned to these categories for each period in which they are in
operation. Thus, if a bank grows from $100 million in assets in 1987 to $500
million in 1997, that bank will ﬁrst be considered a medium-sized entity,
and later, after crossing the arbitrary size threshold, will be a larger bank for
the purpose of our speciﬁcation.
The econometric unraveling of this volatility is easily motivated by basic
portfolio theory. In that spirit, we model a bank’s exposure to a country as
dependent on the real rate of returns on investments in that country c,
which are assumed to be functions of local interest rates, it
cand on real GDP
growth rates, GGDPt
c. These foreign country fundamentals are assessed rel-
182 Linda S. Goldbergative to home market conditions, captured by U.S. real interest rates and
U.S. real GDP growth. Thus, we express the (log) claims of bank iinto coun-
try c at time t, Expt
ic, as10
(1) Expt
ic   ai
0   ai
1t   ar
2   ar
2t   b   it
c   c   it
us   d   GGDPt
c
  e   GGDPt
us.
The terms ai   ai
1t allow for the possibility that some banks have higher av-
erage changes and higher trend changes in the foreign exposure of their
claims, independent of the time series variables in our speciﬁcation. The
terms ar   ar
2t allow for the possibility that, regardless of observable funda-
mentals, some regions are more popular destinations for investment across
banks. This popularity is modeled as having mean and trend components.
In order to avoid estimation problems potentially arising from the unit
root properties of GDP growth, real interest rate, and claim series, we ﬁrst
diﬀerence equation (1). With this diﬀerencing, the bank and regional con-
stant terms drop out, and the bank and regional trend terms enter the re-
sulting ﬁrst-diﬀerence speciﬁcation in levels.
(2) ∆Expt
ic   ai
1   ar
2   b   ∆it
c   c   ∆it
us   d   ∆GGDPt
c
  e   ∆GGDPt
us
Equation (2) is our basic testing speciﬁcation, stating that the change in a
U.S. bank claims on any country has the following: a bank-speciﬁc compo-
nent common across all regions (which can represent a trend toward or
against further internationalization of a bank’s overall exposure level); a re-
gion-speciﬁc component (which can represent a trend change in the popu-
larity of claims of particular regions); components correlated with changes
in foreign country and in U.S. real interest rates; and components correlated
with changes in GDP growth rates for the foreign country and for the
United States.
Using this speciﬁcation, we pose the following questions to the bank data
on country exposures:
• Do banks adjust exposure to diﬀerent regions in similar ways in re-
sponse to ﬂuctuations in the macroeconomic fundamentals of those
regions? Empirically, this translates into tests for common b and d
across regions.
• Is U.S. bank exposure to some regions relatively more sensitive to
changes in U.S. interest rates and U.S. output performance? Empiri-
cally, this translates into tests for common c and e across countries.
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10. We performed a parallel analysis using the share of country c claims in the bank’s port-
folio (i.e., claims relative to bank assets), instead of merely examining the changes in the actual
bank claims on country c. The few substantive diﬀerences in results are noted later in this sec-
tion.•A re smaller banks generally more volatile lenders? Empirically, this
would translate into systematic diﬀerences in estimated coeﬃcients b,
c, d, and e across banks, divided by size.
To estimate the elasticities of country claims with respect to fundamen-
tals, we gather country-speciﬁc data on real GDP and real interest rates. Al-
though our country sample initially contains 200 countries in which U.S.
banks may have claims, we trim the sample in a number of reasonable di-
mensions. First, most banks have held positions in a much smaller set of
countries. Looking across all banks together, on average banks maintain ex-
posures with respect to twenty to twenty-ﬁve countries. Again, the aggre-
gates mask big diﬀerences across larger and smaller banks (appendix table
4A.2). The larger banks in our sample (in the 4th quartile) tend to be in-
vested in many more countries, with the average across these banks at
eighty-six countries in the late 1980s, declining to sixty-six countries in the
late 1990s. Overall, compared with smaller and mid-sized banks, larger
banks have a greater number of countries in which they maintain relatively
smaller foreign exposures.
Moreover, there are some countries in which U.S. banks have little or no
exposure. By deleting these countries, we eliminate 51 of the 180 countries
for which banks individually could provide foreign exposure data.11 Addi-
tional countries are dropped from our sample due to the absence of ade-
quate data on interest rates or GDP.12 Because more data are generally
available on GDP than on interest rates by country, we run the regression
speciﬁcation in a number of ways to generate appropriate insights on GDP
and interest rate elasticities, while maximizing the number of countries and
interval of observations explored. We ﬁnd that the regression results are ro-
bust to the slightly narrower data sample that includes country real interest
rates as well as real GDP growth. Consequently we report only the fully
speciﬁed regressions.
We also want to limit the downward bias on signiﬁcance that could po-
tentially arise from keeping in the sample the large number of banks with
very small foreign portfolio shares. The large quantity of bank observations
with foreign exposure shares well below 1 percent of bank assets indicates
that a relatively small number of U.S. banks account for a large share of the
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11. Among the 200 initial “country” choices for reporting are about 20 international organ-
izations and regional aggregates. We delete these “country” observations immediately. For our
econometrics, we reduce the sample of countries examined by eliminating countries where U.S.
banks, in aggregate, have less than $10 million of total exposure. With other data-related ex-
clusions, we are left with 105 countries for the regression analysis.
12. We generally use lending rates (IFS 60P), “the lending rate to meet the short and medium
term ﬁnancing needs of the private sector, diﬀerentiated by credit worthiness of borrowers and
objectives of ﬁnancing” (IMF 2001). If this rate is unavailable for a country, we use deposit
rates (IFS 60L) or treasury bill rates (IFS 60C). Appendix table 4A.3 details which countries
are ultimately included in our empirical speciﬁcations, along with a categorization of which
countries fall under the heading of Europe, Latin America, Asia, Africa, and other regions.overall bank foreign exposure. We trim the data sample to that used in the
ﬁrst section of table 4.3 by eliminating from the reported regressions all ob-
servations for which bank total foreign exposure is less than 1 percent of to-
tal bank assets.
4.3.1 Results
Regressions based on equation (2) demonstrate signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
the eﬀects of fundamentals on bank claims on countries in diﬀerent regions.
In table 4.8 we include all bank observations. In table 4.9 we report the re-
sults of regressions that diﬀerentiate across banks on the basis of size. In the
reported speciﬁcations, the results are unweighted. The interpretation is
that the results describe what—on average—inﬂuences the claims of indi-
vidual banks, irrespective of diﬀerences across banks in the relative size of
their claims on countries. The results should not, therefore, be viewed as de-
scribing the evolution of total credit to speciﬁc countries or regions.
The ﬁrst row of table 4.8 shows that, across all U.S. banks reporting for-
eign exposures, the claims on speciﬁc countries are on average relatively in-
sensitive to ﬂuctuations in the real interest rates of those countries. More-
over, the GDP growth rates of both industrialized and emerging-market
economies do not generally inﬂuence the claims on these countries by the
average reporting bank.13 The lack of signiﬁcance of own-country GDP
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Table 4.8 Regression Analysis Using Full Panel of Banks and Branches, Unweighted
Developing Countries
Industrialized Latin Middle
Countries Europe America Asia Africa East
 ic
t 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.043 –0.019 –0.001
(0.044) (0.001) (0.000) (0.031) (0.045) (0.003)
 ius
t –0.074∗∗∗ –0.020 0.042∗ –0.098∗∗ 0.017 –0.102
(0.015) (0.623) (0.021) (0.041) (0.155) (0.116)
 GGDPc
t –0.001 0.000 –0.001 –0.001∗∗ 0.001 0.005
(0.003) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.050) (0.024)
 GGDPus
t –0.106∗∗∗ –0.134 0.063∗∗ –0.142∗∗ 0.011 –0.135
(0.021) (0.312) (0.029) (0.056) (0.215) (0.158)
Adjusted R2 0.485
N 21,700
Note:Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include regional ﬁxed effects and bank ﬁxed effects.
Includes only bank observations with foreign exposure exceeding 1 percent of bank assets.
∗∗∗Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
∗Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level.
13. This result also appears in regressions using portfolio shares of country claims (exposure
to a country relative to U.S. bank total assets) as the dependent variable.Table 4.9 Regression Results, by Region and by Bank Size (unweighted speciﬁcation)
Developing Countries
Industrialized Latin Middle
Countries Europe America Asia Africa East
A. Banks with Assets below $50 Million
 ic
t 0.157** 0.000 0.000 0.021 –0.010 –0.001
(0.078) (0.001) (0.000) (0.035) (0.046) (0.003)
 ius
t –0.086*** –0.052 0.025 0.011 0.263 –0.089
(0.023) (0.624) (0.027) (0.092) (0.183) (0.117)
 GGDPc
t 0.000 0.000 –0.001 –0.001 0.010 0.003
(0.003) (0.000) (0.007) (0.001) (0.050) (0.024)
 GGDPus
t –0.126*** –0.293 0.041 0.029 0.313 –0.114
(0.032) (0.333) (0.037) (0.127) (0.251) (0.160)
Adjusted R2 0.2585
N 10,912
B. Banks with Assets between $50 Million and $250 Million
 ic
t 0.043 –0.003 0.153* –0.843*
(0.054) (0.003) (0.085) (0.465)
 ius
t –0.025 –0.055 –0.197*** –0.747** 0.096
(0.026) (0.046) (0.062) (0.355) (1.205)
 GGDPc
t –0.027*** –0.017 –0.056
(0.011) (0.049) (0.070)
 GGDPus
t –0.041 –0.077 –0.278*** –1.051** –0.015
(0.036) (0.064) (0.086) (0.497) (0.941)
Adjusted R2 0.3649
N 4,250
C. Banks with Assets Greater Than $250 Million
 ic
t –0.178* 0.270 0.000 0.175 –0.255 10.212
(0.101) (0.244) (0.000) (0.109) (0.232) (7.215)
 ius
t 0.109*** 5.571 0.121** –0.069 –0.904
(0.027) (8.520) (0.052) (0.063) (0.981)
 ic
t 0.006 –0.030 –0.002 –0.082 1.035*
(0.014) (0.042) (0.009) (0.059) (0.534)
 ius
t –0.148*** 0.643 0.169** –0.112 0.423
(0.038) (1.003) (0.072) (0.087) (0.985)
Adjusted R2 0.2028
N 6,538
Notes:Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include regional ﬁxed effects and bank ﬁxed effects.
Table includes only bank observations with foreign exposure exceeding 1 percent of bank assets.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.growth and own-country interest rates for U.S. banks’ claims on emerging
markets is a consistent pattern observed across regression speciﬁcations.
More important determinants of U.S. bank claims abroad are the pat-
terns in U.S. macroeconomic variables. Industrialized and Latin American
country regions are the two regions in which these U.S. variables often have
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects. All else being equal, when interest rates rise
in the United States, U.S. banks consistently reduce their claims on other in-
dustrialized countries, suggesting the possibility of substitution across mar-
kets. Likewise, higher U.S. GDP growth is consistently associated with re-
duced claims on other industrialized countries.
Higher U.S. GDP growth and interest rates have mixed eﬀects on emerg-
ing markets, with some sensitivity to the regression speciﬁcations. For ex-
ample, higher U.S. interest rates are associated with higher claims on Latin
American countries in the unweighted regressions of table 4.8. Similar re-
sults arise in a claims-weighted version of this regression. For Asia, the sign
of this relationship is negative for the average bank reported in table 4.8
butb e comes positive in claims-weighted specifications. The direction of
U.S. GDP growth on emerging-market claims is consistent across the un-
weighted and weighted regression speciﬁcations but diﬀers across Latin
America and Asia. Claims on Latin America expanded for a reporting U.S.
bank when the United States grew faster, but on average claims on Asian
countries contracted.
Next, we consider whether the broad description arising from table 4.8 is
also pertinent when we divide banks according to their size but again com-
pute regressions for the “average bank,” that is, regressions unweighted by
bank size or total claims.14 We ﬁnd that there are in fact observable diﬀer-
ences across smaller and larger banks in the determinants of their claims on
foreign countries. These diﬀerences are apparent through comparisons of
parts A, B, and C of table 4.9.
First, for the banks in the smallest asset class category (part A), we ob-
serve diﬀerences in the role of fundamentals for claims on the (non-U.S.) in-
dustrialized countries versus those on emerging markets. While increases in
industrialized country real interest rates are associated with larger claims
on industrialized countries, claims on emerging markets are uncorrelated
with real local lending rates. Claims on the (non-U.S.) industrialized coun-
tries fall when U.S. interest rates rise, consistent with some substitution
between claims on the United States and other industrialized country bor-
rowers. For the average small bank, none of the emerging-market macro-
economic fundamentals included in the regressions were statistically signif-
icant and qualitatively important determinants of changes in their claims
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14. Bank size has been shown to be a relevant consideration in the U.S. lending markets: For
example, as Hancock and Wilcox (1998) show, in response to declines in their own capital
small banks shrank their loan portfolios considerably more than did large banks.on speciﬁc emerging markets. These patterns of results were robust to the
inclusion of crisis period dummy variables in the regression speciﬁcations.15
For the larger banks shown in part C, we again see the pattern of local
country macroeconomic fundamentals being important mainly in the con-
text of U.S. bank claims on industrialized countries. Within the emerging-
market groupings, U.S. bank claims on Latin American countries expand
when the United States grows faster and when U.S. interest rates rise.16 For
the other emerging-markets regions, claims on speciﬁc countries are not as
tightly correlated with the macroeconomic fundamentals.
Finally, we generally observe larger point estimates on the coeﬃcients in
the regression speciﬁcations using observations for the larger U.S. banks.
The diﬀerences in these point estimates are statistically signiﬁcant in the
context of claims on Latin American countries. Especially with respect to
positions in emerging-market economies, the regressions suggest that
trends in claims may be very signiﬁcant for the smaller banks, as opposed
to emerging market macroeconomic fundamentals. By contrast, larger
bank positions have less important regional trends and appear to be more
responsive to fundamentals. These patterns of results are robust to inclu-
sion of crisis period dummy variables.
4.4 Concluding Remarks
Foreign credit to emerging markets is viewed as one means for deepening
emerging capital markets and potentially reducing the severity of crises
when they occur. One relevant issue is the stability of foreign bank claims
on these markets and the source of volatility in these claims. U.S. banks gen-
erally seem to have been steady providers of credit to these markets in the
face of ﬂuctuations in emerging-market growth rates and interest rates. Be-
cause lending by banks within emerging markets is likely to be more sensi-
tive to conditions in their home markets, these results suggest that the U.S.
banks may contribute to more stable overall credit supplies in emerging
markets.
On the other hand, the bank claims on emerging markets by large U.S.
banks are sensitive to U.S. cyclical conditions. The countries end up with a
more diversiﬁed supply of credit, but claims on emerging markets could
ﬂuctuate with conditions in foreign markets. The patterns of exposure of
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15. We considered ﬁve distinct crisis dates: Latin American debt crisis (1984:1–1985:1);
ERM crisis (1992:3–1993:1); Tequila crisis (1994:4–1995:1); Asia crisis (1997:3–1997:4); and
Russian default (1998:3–1998:4). We entered these ﬁve period dummies into the regression
speciﬁcation of equation (2), permitting the eﬀects to diﬀer across the countries of the six re-
gions in which U.S. banks have positions.
16. For claims on Latin America, there are qualitative diﬀerences between these results and
those generated using U.S. bank portfolio allocations. The alternative approach shows that
claims on Latin American countries, when measured relative to the overall assets of the spe-
ciﬁc banks, fall—not rise—signiﬁcantly as U.S. GDP growth and real interest rates increase.small U.S. banks may be driven more by trends, while the exposures of
larger U.S. banks may be driven more by changes in market fundamentals.
There is little evidence of systematic diﬀerences in the behavior of U.S. bank
claims across periods associated with international ﬁnancial crises.
Appendix
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Table 4A.1 U.S. Bank Conditional Exposures by Region
Industrialized Developing Latin Middle
Countries Europe America Asia Africa East
1984–89
Industrialized countries 1.00 0.40 0.94 0.64 0.38 0.38
Developing Europe 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.86 0.74 0.78
Latin America 0.92 0.39 1.00 0.61 0.37 0.49
Asia 0.99 0.54 0.98 1.00 0.54 0.61
Africa 1.00 0.78 0.99 0.91 1.00 0.73
Middle East 0.97 0.62 0.98 0.78 0.55 1.00
1990–95
Industrialized countries 1.00 0.25 0.85 0.57 0.27 0.27
Developing Europe 0.98 1.00 0.98 0.80 0.68 0.83
Latin America 0.86 0.25 1.00 0.53 0.27 0.51
Asia 0.96 0.34 0.89 1.00 0.36 0.58
Africa 0.97 0.61 0.96 0.77 1.00 0.79
Middle East 0.90 0.38 0.91 0.62 0.40 1.00
1996–2000
Industrialized countries 1.00 0.36 0.89 0.62 0.34 0.34
Developing Europe 0.96 1.00 0.96 0.81 0.63 0.82
Latin America 0.78 0.32 1.00 0.53 0.31 0.52
Asia 0.92 0.45 0.89 1.00 0.46 0.60
Africa 0.95 0.66 0.98 0.86 1.00 0.86
Middle East 0.87 0.50 0.94 0.66 0.49 1.00
Note: Conditional on activity in a region in the stub column, the row entries provide the probability of
also having a position in the other regions.
Table 4A.2 Average Number of Countries in Which Banks Have Foreign Exposures
Exposures
1984–89 1990–95 1996–2000
All reporting banks 27 20 21
Quartile 1 14 12 13
Quartile 2 24 14 15
Quartile 3 35 33 35
Quartile 4 86 76 66
Note: Banks are divided into quartiles according to their asset size.References
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Table 4A.3 Countries Included in Regression Analysis, Using IFS Classiﬁcation
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Comment Simon Johnson
Linda S. Goldberg has provided us with fascinating information on three
important questions. First, which U.S. banks lend outside the United
States? Second, what is the pattern of this international lending, and how
has this changed over time? Third, which parts of this bank lending are rel-
atively volatile, and what drives this volatility? On all three issues, Goldberg
both provides us with valuable new facts and points the way to further em-
pirical and theoretical research.
Goldberg establishes that a great deal of cross-border lending is ac-
counted for by relatively small banks, particularly those focused on Latin
America. Very large banks also lend internationally but do so more through
their own subsidiaries. Over time, fewer banks have been engaged in inter-
national lending, presumably as a result of bank consolidation. However,
some of the smaller banks have increased their foreign exposure shares over
time. There has also been an interesting increase in lending to the nonbank
private sector.
Goldberg also shows that the portfolio share of foreign lending for U.S.
banks is moved by U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) growth, not by U.S.
interest rates (with interesting diﬀerences between the coeﬃcients on lend-
ing to developed and emerging markets). This lending also does not appear
to be sensitive to local GDP ﬂuctuations or to movements in local real in-
terest rates.
Goldberg has created a fascinating new data set that allows fresh insight
into important questions. She has also covered a great deal of ground in
terms of the preliminary analysis presented here. My suggestions are in-
tended to indicate possible areas for further research (probably in the form
of several separate papers).
My ﬁrst question concerns exactly why U.S. banks lend overseas. Does
this help them generate a superior return on equity, or does it represent
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Simon Johnson is an associate professor of entrepreneurship at the Sloan School of Man-
agement, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and a faculty research fellow of the National
Bureau of Economic Research.some form of agency problem—or, perhaps, even a way to circumvent reg-
ulatory controls (e.g., perhaps it is easier to engage in connected lending to
overseas aﬃliates)? Why is there so much more lending to Latin America by
smaller banks than to Europe or Asia or anywhere else? Why does lending
to Latin America have diﬀerent characteristics, for example in terms of its
sensitivity to U.S. GDP growth?
The volatility of U.S. bank lending could be usefully compared in more
detail to that of local lending in various markets. Goldberg has already
looked at this question in other work, but this new data set should allow fur-
ther insight. Does it help or hurt stability when there is a large amount of
lending by U.S. banks in a particular economy? Do U.S. banks pull out at
the ﬁrst sign of trouble, or are they able to take a longer view? Is there evi-
dence that their presence is at all stabilizing, compared with the behavior of
local banks? (See, e.g., the recent work of Rafael La Porta and Florencio
Lopez-de-Silanes on Mexican banks after 1994.) The preliminary results
presented here suggest that U.S. banks are not volatile lenders, but it would
be helpful to look at this issue in more detail (and possibly to write the con-
clusive paper on this topic).
It would be useful to know more about the nature of overseas borrowers
from U.S. banks. Some more work may be needed to combine this data with
information on the reported exposure of publicly traded banks (and when
they take loan loss provisions), but it will probably repay the eﬀort. Are U.S.
banks lending to exporters? Does this practice skim the cream oﬀ local
banking relationships? Does this address the concerns about the con-
straints on ﬁnancing development in weak legal systems measured by Ra-
jan and Zingales (1998)? Does it help to keep the economy going even if lo-
cal banks collapse? Quantifying these various eﬀects would be very useful.
Looking at particular countries where there has been severe disruption of
the banking system would be helpful (e.g., Indonesia from 1998.) To get at
these issues, it might be worth starting the data set a little earlier (e.g., in the
late 1970s or 1980) to compare the eﬀect of several crises, for example those
in 1982 and 1994–95. These data could also be related to controversies
about the timing and causes of crises.
Does the nature of U.S. lending diﬀer according to the institutional char-
acteristics of the countries involved? For example, is lending to European
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) coun-
tries diﬀerent in a measurable way compared with lending to emerging
markets or just poorer countries? Using the La Porta et al. (1998) classiﬁ-
cation of institutional systems would be useful here (e.g., as an alternative
to the geographic classiﬁcation in table 4.1).
Overall, Goldberg has written an extremely useful paper that provides
important facts for researchers and regulators. It is my strong hope that
Goldberg will use this information to write several more important papers.
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Discussion Summary
Charles W. Calomiris made three suggestions. He ﬁrst oﬀered the following
explanation for the cyclicality of domestic and foreign bank lending in
emerging markets. During a boom, domestic banks have access to cheap
capital (from retained earnings) and thus can expand lending, which they
sustain even in the initial contraction phase because they have a compara-
tive advantage in identifying the quality of loans. During the period of deep
recession, however, domestic banks cannot lend (because they have lost
most of their capital), while foreign banks enter the market as a result of re-
laxed regulation on entry barriers. Thus, foreign lending is countercyclical.
He suggested taking into account the business cycle of the recipient coun-
try when studying the bank-lending behavior.
His second suggestion was to isolate the relative capital cost eﬀect from
the portfolio opportunity eﬀect by controlling for the cost of raising equity,
as for example by using variables like underwriting costs. He also suggested
to control for Spanish GDP cycle when studying Latin American countries.
Sebastian Edwards commented on the speciﬁc breakdown points of the
period. The ﬁrst subperiod of 1984–89 coincided with the Brady plan, at
which time many banks exited the market; the end of the second subperiod
of 1990–95 was around the time of Mexican crises, which also led many
banks to go bankrupt.
He raised questions on the time series results of the paper because the
sample period is very heterogeneous. For example, Argentina and Peru had
hyperinﬂation, and Mexico underwent a series of crises; moreover, the
banking sector in Latin America was very much regulated until 1989, and
therefore the interest rates were not meaningful before that. He said that
these structural changes during the sample period could be the reason for
some of the strange ﬁndings in the paper (the dramatically diﬀerent results
for lending to Latin American and Europe). Lastly, Edwards suggested that
one could do some more advanced studies on events such as ﬁnancial inte-
gration by combining this data set and information on emerging markets’
ﬁnancial integration.
Rudi Dornbusch raised the question of whether the lending by small
banks to Latin America is trade credit (which is safer and has extra tax ben-
When Is U.S. Bank Lending to Emerging Markets Volatile? 193eﬁts). He said that if this was the case, then one could run a gravity regres-
sion (before Andrew Rose does it) on lending of this particular sector.
(Later in the discussion Nouriel Roubini conjectured that a large part of the
lending of small U.S. banks in Latin America may reﬂect the money-laun-
dering activities of small Miami banks instead of the provision of trade
credits.)
Robert Dekle suggested that when looking at the transmission of shocks,
one could include the nonperforming loan ratio and the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements (BIS) capital ratio to capture the weakness of the bank-
ing sector.
Michael P. Dooleymade the remark that a piece of the folklore is that Eu-
ropean banks behave diﬀerently from the U.S. banks, so it would be inter-
esting to include European banks as a control group and see whether U.S.
banks are indeed diﬀerent. He also suggested including variables such as the
Federal Reserve Bank’s ratings on emerging countries and the individual
bank’s loan loss experience in these countries in the regressions.
Joshua Aizenman suggested using exchange rates and measures of the
probability of crises and country risk in the regressions.
Carlos A. Véghcommented on the issue of volatility and cyclicality. First,
what is the explanation for the fact that small foreign banks are more pro-
cyclical than big foreign banks? Second, he raised a question on the relative
procyclicality of foreign banks compared to domestic banks. This is impor-
tant for understanding whether foreign banks make cycles in these coun-
tries more or less pronounced. Third, he talked about the ﬁnding that U.S.
banks’ lending to emerging countries is highly correlated with the U.S.
GDP. He said that when the United States is in a boom, interest rates go up,
which typically implies that the GDP growth in emerging economies goes
down, so U.S. lending is countercyclical to the cycles of emerging countries.
Jeﬀrey A. Frankel, in support of Vegh’s last argument, cited a paper by
Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart in which the authors argue that a reason
for the large capital inﬂow to emerging countries in the early 1990s was the
slow growth of Japan and United States.
John McHale commented on the weak sensitivity of U.S. lending to eco-
nomic conditions in emerging countries. He asked how consistent this was
with the turnaround of capital inﬂows to emerging markets during crises,
and whether the behavior of U.S. banks was diﬀerent from that of non-U.S.
banks. Second, he commented on the ﬁnding that foreign lending is insen-
sitive to local interest rates. As he pointed out, high interest rates can be at-
tractive to foreign investors but may also signal bad economic conditions (a
crisis). The ﬁnding of the weak eﬀects might be the result of using pooled
data, which suggests that one should control for crisis periods versus regu-
lar periods.
Roubini suggested that this rich data set could be used to test hypotheses
related to theories about capital ﬂight, and in particular to test whether cap-
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be done by looking at what motivates banks’ behavior during crises.
Linda S. Goldberg agreed that cycles are very important in studying for-
eign banks’ lending behavior and indicated that she intended to incorporate
that angle in subsequent work. This, she said, would contribute to a better
understanding of the role of interest rates. She also said that it would be
worthwhile to rethink the way regions were deﬁned. An alternative could be
to deﬁne country groups by their income levels. She agreed that the event
study that Roubini suggested would be interesting and noted that one could
also compare the U.S. banks’ and Spanish banks’ lending in Latin Ameri-
can countries. On the volatility of U.S. (or overall foreign) banks’ lending
relative to domestic bank lending, she cited one of her earlier studies. In that
paper she showed that lending from both foreign and domestic private
banks was procyclical (with respect to the local economy), but that the lo-
cal lending was more procyclical because one of the sources of local banks’
funding—local deposits—is more procyclical.
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